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China has three different types of patents – 
invention patents, utility model patents and 
design patents – which can be associated 
with different types of innovation, namely 
breakthrough and incremental innovation. 
Breakthrough innovations, also called 
‘radical’ or ‘discontinuous’ innovations, 
are cutting edge and completely new, 
whereas incremental innovations are small 
improvements on existing inventions.  
A healthy mix of both types is important 
to an economy, but breakthrough 
innovations typically confer a higher level 
of competitiveness. 
Given their relatively lower threshold 
for inventive step, utility model patents in 
China are often associated with incremental 
innovations. Invention patents may also be 
associated with incremental innovations, 
although given that they have a higher 
threshold for inventive step, which is 
confirmed by a substantive examination 
(a far more rigorous examination than 
that required of utility models), they have 
a higher potential than utility models of 
also being associated with breakthrough 
innovations.
So-called ‘quality’ patents, as defined 
hereafter, must meet the statutory 
threshold for patentability in China, and 
be associated with an invention that has a 
reasonable potential of being transformed 
into something useful (ie, contributing to 
economic, social or environmental progress, 
which includes – but is not limited 
to – being commercialised). Highest-
quality patents are those that meet these 
aforementioned criteria and in addition 
have a reasonable potential of being 
associated with a breakthrough innovation. 
Low-quality patents are those that do not 
meet the definition of quality (or highest-
quality) patents. 
Critique 1. Utility models in China have 
a higher risk than invention patents of 
being low quality. This is supported 
by invalidation figures and evidence of 
patents being filed in bad faith and used 
in malicious prosecution actions. 
While some utility models inevitably meet 
the standard for quality patents, according 
to invalidation figures, there appear to 
be more low-quality utility models than 
invention patents. Utility models in China 
typically face invalidation rates over twice 
as high as invention patents (ie, 47% as 
opposed to 21% of those patents that are 
challenged in front of the Patent Re-
Examination Board). It is likely that these 
figures for utility models would be even 
higher if patent enforcement procedures 
were improved in certain ways. That said, 
as a percentage of total patents granted 
and in terms of absolute numbers, China’s 
invalidation rates for invention patents 
and utility models, as well as design 
patents, are relatively low even compared 
to international standards. Thus, these 
numbers alone do not suggest that China 
has a significant absolute number of low-
quality utility model patents.
Utility models appear to run a higher 
risk than invention patents of being filed in 
bad faith and used in malicious prosecution 
By Dan Prud’homme
Although China became the world’s 
leading patent filer in 2011, patent 
quality is still a serious issue. Is the 
country’s network of patent-related 
policies and practices actually 
contributing to these problems and 
hampering innovation?
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and four years, and between two and seven 
years for those owned by foreign patentees. 
The lifespan of design patents owned by 
Chinese patentees was between one and 
four years, and between two and seven 
years for those owned by foreign patentees. 
These figures raise serious concerns that 
many patents in China – particularly those 
filed by domestic applicants – are not being 
transformed into innovations, or at least 
not particularly useful innovations.
By way of comparison, the lifespans of 
invention patents in China are substantially 
shorter than the average life of an 
equivalent patent in a variety of developed 
countries. For example, the median lifespan 
of patents in the United States is around 
12 years. German patents typically have a 
lifespan of just over 12 years. The typical 
lifespan of Japanese patents is around 17 
years. Patent lifespans on patents granted 
by the Finnish Patent Office in recent years 
are over 11 years. While a number of factors 
not necessarily related to patent quality 
partially explain these trends, the figures 
still indicate that the number of quality 
and highest-quality patents in China is, on 
average, comparatively lower than in these 
other countries.
Further, it is strikingly clear that 
foreigners hold a much higher ratio of 
invention patents in force than domestic 
entities as a proportion of their individual 
filings, while Chinese entities hold a higher 
ratio of utility models and design patents 
in force. As illustrated in Chart 1, between 
2006 and 2011, out of all patents in force 
owned by domestic entities, 85% were not 
invention patents (ie, 48% were utility 
models and 37% were design patents), 
whereas only 15% of patents in force 
owned by domestic entities were invention 
patents. In contrast, as illustrated in Chart 
2, during the same time period, out of all 
foreign patents in force in China, 79% were 
for invention patents and only 21% were 
for utility models and design patents (2% 
and 19%, respectively). These numbers 
show low rates of invention patents in 
force held by domestic filers, which make 
up the vast majority of patent holdings in 
China. This suggests that despite China’s 
patent filing explosion, many patents filed 
in China are not of the highest quality. 
That said, there has been a recent 
uptick in the number of invention patents 
in force out of total patents in force owned 
by domestic entities in China. Specifically, 
domestic entities owned slightly more 
than 50% of all invention patents in force 
in 2011 – a change from the past trend of 
foreign enterprises owning more.
actions, and so are more likely to be of 
lower quality than invention patents. Given 
that utility models are cheaper and easier 
to obtain than invention patents (because 
utility models have lower patentability 
thresholds and do not undergo a rigorous 
mandatory examination), in principle it 
makes more sense for applicants to apply 
for utility models if they intend to utilise 
patents for the sole purpose of malicious 
prosecution actions. Applicants are also 
more likely to choose utility model patents 
for bad-faith filings for this same reason. 
While it is not possible to assess fully the 
extent to which patents are being filed for 
and used in such ways (although some news 
articles suggest that up to 50% of patents 
in China are used as such), a number of 
sources confirm that there have been 
concerning cases in China where utility 
model patents in particular were filed on 
inventions that were already part of the 
prior art and were used as harassment 
tools, barriers to entry and restrictions on 
freedom to operate.
Critique 2. Many patents in China – 
particularly those filed by domestic 
applicants – appear not to be 
transformed into something useful, 
or at least could be transformed into 
something more useful. As such, they 
do not meet or could better meet the 
second criterion in the definition of 
quality (and highest-quality) patents. 
Patents in force and lifespans of patents 
are some of the best available metrics to 
assess this trend. 
Patents in force, which are patents that  
are granted and valid, are one useful metric 
of the value of patents, as they measure 
patents that have not been invalidated 
or abandoned by the owner and thus are 
ostensibly serving some commercial or 
other use. Of the 2,216,082 patents in force 
in China in 2010, 82.4% were owned by 
domestic filers and 17.6% by foreign filers. 
On average, patents in China – 
particularly those owned by domestic 
entities – are maintained only for a 
relatively short time. A 2011 study by 
Gao, Li and Cheng of the Beijing IP Rights 
Institute found that the average lifespan 
for invention patents awarded to domestic 
Chinese entities is only five years, whereas 
it is nine years for foreign-owned invention 
patents. Other data shows that as of 2010, 
only 4.6% of invention patents in China 
were maintained for more than 10 years. 
The typical lifespan of utility models owned 
by Chinese patentees was between two 
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in China. Hu finds that strengthening IP 
rights enforcement in China should lessen 
risk and encourage foreign firms to patent 
in China. He also finds that recent surges 
in patent activity by foreign firms in China 
largely take the form of “patenting existing 
intellectual property that they created 
elsewhere”. As such, if China further 
improved its IP rights environment, it would 
likely attract more highest-quality patents 
from foreign entities.
Ratios of utility model filings to invention 
patent filings
Statistical analysis shows that China is 
witnessing a disproportionately small filing 
of highest-quality patents (ie, more filings 
of less than highest-quality patents than 
highest-quality patents). Utility model 
filings are outpacing filings of invention 
patents in recent years, which is a trend led 
by domestic filers. Table 1 illustrates that in 
terms of absolute numbers, in 2004, for the 
first time during the sample period of 1996-
2011, more total invention patents were 
filed than total utility models. However, 
in 2010 and 2011 more total utility models 
were filed than total invention patents. 
Chart 3 shows how this translates into the 
ratios of invention patents to utility models 
filings recently shifting to pre-2004 ratios. 
Although this is not an indication 
that aggregate patent quality in China is 
declining, there are reasonable concerns 
that this shift is less than optimal for 
patent quality and innovation. It raises the 
following questions:
•  Why is there such a rise in utility  
model applications and what type  
of government resources and  
policies might be (intentionally  
or unintentionally) supporting  
this growth?
•  Are any risks associated with  
this proliferation?
•  What does this mean with regard to 
the direction of innovation that the 
government desires and that China’s 
economy deserves? 
Although difficult to answer fully, some 
responses highlight the downsides of this 
proliferation of utility models: 
•  Some utility models might be 
increasingly filed only because certain 
Chinese policies and practices are 
providing perverse incentives for the 
filing of low-quality and less than 
highest-quality patents.
•  There are higher risks of utility models 
being low quality than invention 
patents (as mentioned previously).
Critique 3. Relative to certain 
benchmarks, there likely could, and thus 
should, be more quality and highest-
quality patents filed by Chinese entities 
and by foreign entities in China. A 
non-exhaustive list of tools for gauging 
these trends includes patent citations, 
empirical research on foreign firms’ 
patenting decisions and ratios of utility 
model filings to invention patent filings. 
Patent citations
The frequency of patent citations in patent 
application literature and also in non-
patent application literature can be used 
as a gauge of the significance of a patent 
(inclusive of its contribution to economic, 
social or environmental progress), and thus 
its quality. The idea is that particularly 
significant patented inventions will be cited 
more often in such documents.
The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
has constructed a Patent Quality Index, 
which focuses heavily on patent citations. 
This ranks China quite low. According to 
the 2011 index, China’s performance from 
2000-2010 is ranked below the world 
average, the OECD average and the EU27 
average. It also ranked second lowest out 
of 25 individual countries highlighted in an 
OECD report featuring the index, including 
ranking lower than Brazil (which is a 
developing country, like China). The index 
is a composite indicator using six criteria: 
•  Forward citations (number of citations 
of a patent).
•  Backward citations (number of patents 
and scientific papers cited by a patent). 
•  Patent family size (number of countries 
in which that patent is taken).
•  Number of claims.
•  Generality index (dispersion of patent 
citations over technology classes).
•  Grant lag.
These scores generally reflect that 
China has a way to go in producing more 
quality and highest-quality patents.
Empirical research on foreign firms’ 
patenting decisions in China
Patent quality in China could be more 
impressive if it included more patents 
on breakthrough technologies developed 
by foreigners. A number of empirical 
analyses by Albert Guangzhou Hu of the 
National University of Singapore show that 
weaknesses in China’s institutional and 
regulatory system for IP rights, in addition 
to other factors, deter foreign firms from 
developing and filing highest-quality patents 
Chart 1.  Domestic patents in force in
China (avg 2006-2011) 
Chart 2.  Foreign patents in force in China
(avg 2006-2011) 
Source: SIPO statistics; calculations
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ability to be transformed into something 
useful and thus constitute innovation), 
and what appears to be China’s overly 
heavy focus on these patent targets instead 
of a more dynamic gauging of a range of 
innovation-relevant targets (eg, those 
involving educational capacity, R&D returns, 
products to market and patent quality 
metrics) may not optimally, or at worst 
distortedly, foster innovation in China. 
Also, given the still-developing nature 
of China’s regulatory and institutional 
framework – for example, in comparison 
to developed European countries – it is 
easier for lone patent targets as opposed 
to a composite of innovation targets to 
•  The proliferation of utility models in 
China, if sustained or magnified (eg, as 
might be the case in 2015, according 
to projections from Dulling the Cutting 
Edge depicted in Chart 4), might reflect a 
less-than-optimal balance in the country 
between incremental innovation and 
breakthrough innovation.
That said, of course, not all utility 
models (and design patents) in China 
are of inherently low quality. This is 
because some of both types of patent 
inevitably meet the standard for quality 
patents. Moreover, it is because a variety 
of evidence debunks the idea that utility 
model patents are always of low value, 
whereas a range of empirical studies show 
that the utility model system in certain 
countries successfully enables movement 
from relatively low levels of innovation 
and competitiveness, and poor diffusion of 
technology, to higher levels. 
What is causing these problems?
A significant amount of China’s patent 
quality problems are caused by a system of 
patent-related policies and practices that 
hampers patent quality and innovation. 
Although, given their intertwined nature, 
it is not always possible clearly to separate 
their impacts on patent quality as distinct 
from those on innovation at large, these 
policies and practices collectively create a 
vicious circle. They hamper patent quality, 
which then hampers related innovation and 
vice versa (ie, they hamper components 
of innovation, which then hampers patent 
quality, which then again further hampers 
innovation). Dulling the Cutting Edge 
devotes the majority of its 229 pages to 
describing these policies and practices. The 
study divides them into three categories, 
which are briefly summarised here.
Government-set patent targets  
and indicators
There appears to be an overly heavy 
focus on quantitative patent targets in 
China. Dulling the Cutting Edge uncovers 
10 national-level quantitative patent 
targets and over 150 municipal/provincial 
targets, mostly to be met by 2015. This 
overshadows the type of benchmarking 
that better reflects the nuances underlying 
creativity – a fundamental building block 
of quality patents, and highest-quality 
patents in particular. 
Moreover, absolute numbers of patent 
applications, or even patents granted, are 
an imperfect single indicator of the actual 
economic relevance of inventions (ie, their 
Table 1. Total (by domestic and foreign filers) invention patent versus utility model apps  
in China (1996-2011)
Chart 3. Total invention patent versus utility model applications in China by ratio 










Source:  SIPO statistics database; calculations. *Ratios are approximations.
Source:  SIPO statistics; calculations. Ratios are approximations
Year Invention Utility Ratio*
  patents models
1996 28,517 49.604 0.6:1
1997 33,666 50,129 0.7:1 
1998 35,960 51,397 0.6:1
1999 36,694 57,492 0.6:1
2000 51,747 68,815 0.8:1
2001 63,204 79,722 0.8:1
2002 80,232 93,139 0.9:1
2003 105,318 109,115 1:1
2004 130,133 112,825 1.2:1
2005 173,327 139,566 1.2:1
2006 210,490 161,366 1.3:1
2007 245,161 181,324 1.4:1
2008 289,838 225,586 1.3:1
2009 314,573 310,771 1:1
2010 391,177 409,836 1:1
2011 526,412 585,467 0.9:1
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decrees abolishing such practices, as well 
as other financial incentives (ie, outside 
government procurement preferences). 
Some incentives come from:
•  Subsidies in China’s Central Foreign 
Trade Development Fund, which is 
worth over Rmb37.7 billion according to 
some estimates.
•  Financial support from funds meant to 
build domestic standards. 
•  Various science and technology funds 
and other invention-specific funds.
•  Tax deductions in the high and new 
technology enterprise scheme.
This policy approach to innovation 
appears less than optimal, as it does not 
seem predicated on rigorously proven 
economic analysis. 
There are a number of other concerns 
surrounding government incentives for 
patent development and/or with patent-
related requirements. These include certain 
approaches to subsidising official fees for 
patent-application processing and related 
attorney fees that, despite some recent 
reforms, need further improvement. There 
are a wide range of other incentives for 
employers to motivate their employees to 
invent, but not necessarily to innovate. Also, 
many state funds designed to encourage 
innovation (eg, via the 973 Programme and 
Torch Programme) are tied up with overly 
broad restrictions, which can lessen their 
effectiveness in building quality patents. 
Discriminatory standardisation 
approaches and raw deals can hamper 
patent quality in China. De jure and de 
facto discrimination in the creation and 
application of standards may actively 
encourage standardisation initiatives that 
will ultimately fail domestically and/or 
during international expansion attempts, 
thus wasting resources and detracting from 
healthy innovation. Among other negative 
effects, relying on raw deals (eg, forced 
technology transfer as a precondition for 
market access) to push foreign companies 
to contribute to innovation in China 
may lessen certain domestic companies’ 
incentives to innovate, and deter foreign 
enterprises from contributing valuable 
knowledge to building highest-quality 
patents and linked innovation in China.
Other policies and practices also 
hamper patent quality and innovation in 
China. These include ambiguities in the 
rules on technology import and import 
and export. They include serious concerns 
serious concerns with the recently 
drafted Service Invention Regulations, 
which appear to outline overly restrictive 
be reached through skirting appropriate 
monitoring and evaluation, IP rights 
enforcement and other quality control 
mechanisms. As such, overemphasis 
on quantitative patent targets in China 
undermines the ostensible underlying 
policy of sustainably building quality 
patents and encouraging innovation. 
On a related note, there is uncertainty 
that the variety of patent-based performance 
evaluation mechanisms in China sufficiently 
discourages low-quality patents. These 
evaluation mechanisms apply to:
•  Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and other enterprises. 
•  Experts/academics and managers, and 
research institutes and universities.
•  Party officials and government 
ministries, including State Intellectual 
Property Office (SIPO) examiners.
•  Performance reviews for patent 
application writers/intermediaries.
Policies and other measures designed to 
promote patents
China has a wide range of patent-specific 
and otherwise patent-related policies, as 
well as other measures meant to encourage 
quality patents and highest-quality patents 
in particular. However, some of these can 
actually discourage patents and innovation. 
Disconcertingly, several measures 
contain requirements for indigenous IP 
rights, which are usually defined as IP 
rights owned by a Chinese entity that 
are linked to financial incentives. These 
initiatives include certain government 
procurement preferences, despite 2011 
Chart 4.  Total (foreign + domestic) patent applications in China in 2011 versus  
2015 estimates* 
Source: SIPO statistics; calculations; 2015 
estimates using methodological Approach 
A from Dulling the Cutting Edge (which is 
based upon recent past growth rates and 
with all else held constant)
Total (domestic + foreign) patent  
applications in China (2011)
Estimated total (domestic + foreign) 
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and the sub-optimal patent quality they 
create (collectively, the vicious circle): 
•  First and foremost, given that a 
concerning number of patents in 
China are likely low quality because 
they involve inventions that are never 
properly exploited, their proliferation 
represents an increase in time and 
resources spent on initiatives that lack 
innovation (in contrast, an increased 
number of quality patents reflects a 
growth in innovation). 
•  Second, the vicious circle inhibits 
innovators from preparing properly for 
international competition. 
•  Third, it raises business transaction 
costs (eg, given uncertainty about the 
validity of granted patents, the scope of 
granted patents, whether an invention 
is patentable and/or whether a patent 
will be fully enforced). 
•  Fourth, it can unnecessarily encourage 
patent disputes. 
•  Fifth, it reinforces the low-quality 
components of the patent ecosystem; 
whereas the response of a rational firm  
to a patent system with a sizeable 
number of low-quality patents – which, 
more so than a system with better-
quality patents, results in increased 
litigation, strategic increased litigation, 
strategic behaviour and generally 
increased uncertainty – is to seek more 
patents regardless of their quality. 
•  Sixth, it wastes government resources, 
including those intended to encourage 
innovation and patents; this money 
could be better spent encouraging 
innovation and the development of 
quality patents.
On a macro level, these policies and 
practices, and the sub-optimal patent 
quality ecosystem they create, harm 
innovation – particularly breakthrough 
innovation – as well as overall development 
of science and technology in China. This 
should be of concern to Chinese policy 
makers, businesses and other innovation 
institutions, and consumers.
Why is all this concerning for foreign 
businesses in China? One answer is that 
many of the negative impacts mentioned 
above – particularly the third, fourth and 
fifth – negatively affect both foreign and 
domestic companies in China. 
There are other reasons that foreign 
businesses should be concerned, although 
these are not exclusively related to the 
main issues discussed in this article. One is 
that factors inhibiting innovation restrain 
foreign companies from fully capitalising 
provisions for inventor remuneration. 
There are also inappropriate incremental 
innovation-centric indigenous innovation 
policies. A wide variety of other Chinese 
policies are additionally mentioned in 
Dulling the Cutting Edge that collectively 
create a notable drag on patent quality and 
innovation in China. 
Rules and procedures for reviewing patent 
applications and enforcing patents
There are concerns surrounding rules and 
procedures for patent application review 
and for enforcement of patent disputes that 
discourage building of quality patents in China. 
Patent application review issues include: 
•  An overly burdensome confidentiality 
review, which is required before filing 
patents abroad.
•  Concerns over regulations on the green 
channel for patents.
•  The fact that genetically modified 
plants and other genetic material 
are unreasonably excluded from 
patentability.
The effectively lower inventive step 
requirement for utility models is also 
mentioned by some as inhibiting patent 
quality – an issue that is mentioned in the 
annex of Dulling the Cutting Edge. 
Patent enforcement issues include: 
•  Cases of abuse of patent rights, 
including abuse of right of action and 
malicious prosecution actions.
•  Difficulties in invalidating utility 
models, given limits on the submission 
of prior art.
•  Overly narrow consideration of 
prior art for utility models in pre-
enforcement searches, and instances 
where patent evaluation reports are 
not given appropriate weight in judicial 
infringement proceedings.
•  Lack of mandatory suspension of utility 
model infringement cases pending the 
outcome of validity proceedings.
•  Anti-monopoly Law concerns, including 
ambiguous regulation of patent pools.
•  Difficulty in enforcing process patents.
•  Potentially overly strict limitations 
on granting preliminary injunctions in 
patent cases. 
Other factors listed in Dulling the 
Cutting Edge also make it difficult to enforce 
patents in China.
What negative effects are these policies 
and practices having?
There are a number of often inter-related 
consequences of these policies and practices 
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on the prospect of rising consumption in 
the Chinese market. Specifically, without 
further economic growth in China, which 
is increasingly contingent on widespread 
(genuine) innovation – which for many 
reasons, will not and cannot be sustained 
solely by foreign companies and requires 
significant contributions by domestic 
companies – the level of consumption 
in China will never rise to the level that 
foreign companies hope it will.
How can these negative effects  
be overcome?
These negative effects can be overcome 
through practical reforms. The Chinese 
government, and SIPO in particular, 
realise that China has a patent-quality 
problem that needs fixing and are open 
to suggestions. Dulling the Cutting Edge 
provides over 50 specific and practical 
recommendations which, with the right 
buy-in, can help to address the issues 
mentioned in the study. The European 
Chamber of Commerce in China has 
already started discussing some of these 
recommendations with SIPO, provincial IP 
bureaux and other authorities. Feedback so 
far has overall been positive. 
In order to have an optimal impact, 
these reforms should be accompanied by 
ongoing efforts to address deep-seated 
factors that hamper innovation in China. 
These include:
•  Improving China’s sub-optimal 
education system and credit system for 
financing innovations.
•  Better addressing certain factors  
that restrain consumer demand for  
more innovations.
•  Where feasible, working to change a 
culture that is risk averse. 
What positive impacts will these 
changes have?
Reform will help to sharpen China’s 
patent and larger innovation ecosystem. 
There is no mandatory sequence of first 
improving patent quality in order to 
improve innovation, although this is one 
possible way that things might play out. 
However, introducing reforms will, over 
time, undoubtedly improve both areas. 
Developing quality patents will help to 
minimise the negative consequences of 
current patent quality problems discussed 
in this article. More generally, it will also 
encourage more valuable innovation, 
which will more sustainably drive China’s 
economy and provide for its people, as well 
as attract foreign businesses. 
Action plan A
Dan Prud’homme is business manager 
of the IP rights and R&D groups at the 
European Union Chamber of Commerce 
in China and author of Dulling the Cutting 
Edge: How Patent-Related Policies and 
Practices Hamper Innovation in China
create, not only affect Chinese entities, 
but also harm foreign business interests 
in China.
These negative effects can be 
overcome through practical reforms. Such 
reforms should also be accompanied by 
ongoing efforts to address the deep-seated 
factors that hamper innovation in China.
Reform will help to sharpen China’s 
patent and larger innovation ecosystem 
into one that will sustainably drive its 
economy and provide for its people, as 
well as attract foreign businesses.
There are lessons to be learned  
from the causes of China’s patent  
quality situation:
•  Familiarise yourself with the rules 
and procedures for reviewing patent 
applications and for enforcing patents. 
It is essential to know these rules 
and procedures to prepare yourself 
for possible hurdles when filing and 
enforcing patents in China.
Patent quality in China deserves 
improvement. Utility models in China 
have a higher risk than invention patents 
of being low quality. Many patents 
in China – particularly those filed by 
domestic applicants – are likely not being 
transformed into something useful or 
otherwise being exploited to their fullest 
potential. Relative to certain benchmarks, 
there should be more quality and highest-
quality patents filed by Chinese entities 
and by foreign entities in China.
A complex system of patent-related 
policies and practices creates a vicious 
circle that hampers patent quality and 
innovation in China. This includes certain 
government-set patent targets and 
indicators, policies and other measures 
intended to promote patents, and rules 
and procedures for reviewing patent 
applications and for enforcing patents.
These policies and practices, and the 
sub-optimal patent quality ecosystem they 
•  Familiarise yourself with certain 
patent-related policies and other 
measures that can adversely impact 
on your innovation operations in 
China. By reviewing how these 
instruments have already impacted 
on innovation and patenting, you will 
become more familiar with problems 
experienced by other firms and can 
plan accordingly.
•  Familiarise yourself with how Chinese 
entities (eg, universities, research 
institutes and companies) might appear 
innovative without actually innovating. 
Understand that patents in China 
may not be filed with the intention of 
protecting an innovation, but rather 
in response to sometimes perverse 
government policies and practices. 
This is something to keep in mind when 
assessing a partner for research and/or 
development, or otherwise seeking an 
investment target in China.
